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ABSTRACT 
Studying technology use in unstable and life-threatening 
conditions can help highlight assumptions of use built into 
technologies and foreground contradictions in the design 
of devices and services. This paper provides an account of 
how soldiers, volunteers, and civilians use mobile tech-
nologies in wartime, reporting on fieldwork conducted in 
Western Russia and Eastern Ukraine with people close to 
or participating directly in the armed conflict in the Don-
bas region. We document how private mobile phones and 
computers became a crucial but ambiguous infrastructure 
despite their lack of durability in extreme conditions of a 
military conflict, and their government and military sur-
veillance potential. Our participants rely on a combination 
of myths and significant technical knowledge to negotiate 
the possibilities mobile technologies offer and the life-
threatening reality of enemy surveillance they engender. 
We consider the problems of always-on always-connected 
devices under conditions of war and surveillance and our 
responsibilities as HCI practitioners in the design of social 
technologies. 
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Mobile Media; ICT Infrastructures; Field Study; Appro-
priation; Political Conflict; War 
ACM Classification Keywords 
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INTRODUCTION 
The use of mobile communication technologies in crisis 
situations and armed conflicts is now expected. Research 
in crisis informatics has addressed situations ranging from 
natural disasters to terrorist attacks, investigating the 
dynamics of technology use and theorizing its potential 
impacts [18,23,39]. Several scholars have also turned 
their attention to political activism and the role of mobile 
technologies in armed conflicts [29,41,46]. This work 
teaches us that the use of mobile technologies has positive 
aspects in facilitating quick mobilization, getting help and 
information, and negative aspects in making individuals 
visible to state or enemy surveillance with potentially life-
threatening consequences [25]. Yet there are few in depth 
accounts of how people live and have to negotiate their 
survival in on-going armed conflicts, of the opportunities 
that mobile technologies offer and of the implications of 
digital surveillance in such circumstances. Studying tech-
nology use in unstable and life-threatening conditions can 
foreground contradictions in design of devices and ser-
vices, highlight assumptions of use built into technologies 
and consider the implications of these assumptions. For 
example, we find that under conditions of war notions of 
privacy and surveillance are less abstract for people who 
use social media with the expectation of potential surveil-
lance by their own state and by the enemy.   
In this paper we report on fieldwork conducted in West-
ern Russia and Eastern Ukraine with people close to or 
participating directly in the armed conflict in the Donbas 
region. We consider the role mobile phones play in this 
conflict by focusing on their use by the soldiers and vol-
unteers who are directly involved and by affected civil-
ians. We describe how the expectations of state 
surveillance (and its confirmation through official com-
munication) as well as the technical aspects of enemy 
targeting through geo-location of active mobile devices 
are negotiated against the need to remain connected to 
friends and loved ones beyond the bunkers and dugouts of 
warfare. Mobile communications and social media ena-
bled soldiers and civilians on both sides of the conflict to 
leverage civil society in new ways in their efforts to com-
pensate for a disorganized and under-resourced state of 
military and volunteer fighter groups. These empirical 
findings let us challenge design assumptions embedded in 
technologies given our increasingly unstable world.  
TECHNOLOGIES OF CRISIS, WAR AND POLITICS 
Prior research has examined social media use for political 
activism [5,31,45], but the events of the “Arab Spring” 
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 motivated increasing scholarly attention [1,11,15,31]. The 
development of digital methods for large-scale quantita-
tive social analysis of media content as well as the popu-
larity of online ethnographic approaches made study of 
difficult and potentially dangerous locations possible and 
accessible to scholars worldwide [5,10,39]. For example, 
Zhou et al. [47] did a quantitative study of Twitter use 
during the post-election protests in Iran, analyzing over 
three million tweets of publicly accessible users, thus 
providing insights into the “dynamics of information 
propagation that are special to Twitter” ([47], p.123). Al-
Ani et al. [1] investigated the Egyptian blogosphere dur-
ing the “Arab Spring” uprisings in 2011, based on qualita-
tive and quantitative analysis of blog postings. They 
identified counter-narratives created by Egyptian bloggers 
to protest against the government’s official communica-
tion and described the blogosphere as an “alternative 
public space” [1:25]. Mark et al. [18,19] focused on “war 
diaries”, published by Iraqi bloggers during the war in 
Iraq. Based on topic modeling and a quantitative analysis 
of postings, the authors investigated the relationship be-
tween war postings and other topics, notably postings 
about people’s everyday life and their daily routines. 
The online studies of social media use during crisis and 
political instability are valuable, but tell us less about the 
role of social media in political activities in practice. 
Several studies have gone beyond the focus on infor-
mation available exclusively online, attempting to engage 
participants directly. Semaan and Mark [33] examined 
trust building in disrupted environments, based on (pri-
marily telephone) interviews with Iraqi civilians during 
the second Gulf war, focusing on public identity. In an-
other study Mark and Semaan [34] focused on collabora-
tion structures and patterns of action during wartime, 
based on semi-structured telephone interviews with civil-
ians from Iraq and Israel. Given the potentially dangerous 
nature of field research in politically unstable environ-
ments few studies have conducted research in situ. Wulf 
et al. investigated social media use by political activists 
‘on the ground’ in Tunisia [46], in Republica Srpska [40] 
and in Palestine [45]. Tufekci [41] researched the use of 
social media among political activists in Turkey noting 
creative uses of technology as well as efforts to subvert 
known government surveillance efforts. Working in the 
borderlands of the war zone, Rohde et al. [29] interviewed 
participants in the Syrian civil war. These in-situ studies 
show that although mobile technologies prove a signifi-
cant advantage in coordination and information dissemi-
nation, these devices also enable increased surveillance 
and persecution. Our study adds to these efforts to under-
stand the role of social media and mobile technologies in 
zones of military conflict. We provide an account of 
mundane uses of mobile technologies and the related 
social practices around them in a war zone and in the 
peaceful areas bordering it.  
EASTERN UKRAINE: BRIEF SUMMARY OF CONFLICT 
The current conflict in the Donbas region in Eastern 
Ukraine is deeply connected to Ukraine’s historical con-
text and its relationships with Russia and Europe [26]. 
Poverty, the threat of political persecution, voluntary and 
forced relocations during the Tsarist and Soviet regimes 
repeatedly reconfigured the composition of the population 
of Ukraine [2,26]. The Donbas region of Eastern Ukraine, 
an area rich with coal and iron ore deposits, rapidly indus-
trialized in the late 19th and early 20th centuries. Peasants 
and miners from other parts of the Russian empire and 
later the USSR relocated to urban centers such as Donetsk 
and Luhansk [7,26]. Cities in the Donbas region acquired 
a significant Russian population, while the rural areas 
remained extremely ethnically diverse. At the same time 
many Ukrainians migrated to Russia through forced and 
voluntary migrations throughout the 20th century. The 
modern Ukrainian state came into being in its current 
configuration in 1954 when the Soviet Union added the 
Crimea peninsula to the Ukrainian SSR. In 1991 Ukraine 
SSR became a sovereign state, exiting the Soviet Union 
with a territory stitched together from regions with di-
verse populations and turbulent histories. 
The events of EuroMaidan 
Political protests in Ukraine, known as EuroMaidan, 
precipitated the current conflict in the Donbas region. 
In November 2013 Ukrainian President V. Yanukovych 
refused to sign the Articles of Association Agreement 
with the EU. The free trade agreement with the EU de-
manded a change in Ukraine’s existing trade relations 
with Russia. This refusal to sign signaled that government 
policy was moving to seek closer ties with Russia. In 
response, EuroMaidan protests began in Kyiv and several 
cities across the country. On November 30th the Yanu-
kovych government deployed riot police in Kyiv to bru-
tally disperse the protesters, assaulting many participants 
[14,21]. The next day protests in solidarity with those 
assaulted exploded across Ukraine and continued for the 
next three months. These soon turned from peaceful re-
sistance to violent clashes with government forces, which 
resulted in the deaths of approximately 130 protesters and 
18 police officers across Ukraine [4,14]. Although the 
largest protests and clashes happened in Kyiv, peaceful 
protests, violent clashes and deaths occurred in other 
cities in Ukraine, including Donetsk and Luhansk – the 
epicenters of the current conflict. On February 22 the 
Ukrainian parliament voted to remove Yanukovych, ap-
pointed an interim president and installed a new provi-
sional government. On May 25th 2014, P. Poroshenko was 
elected as the new president of Ukraine. He follows a 
policy of western rapprochement and is supported by the 
EU and the US in return. 
Donbas and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine 
In Eastern Ukraine support for EuroMaidan was limited. 
Here voters were strong supporters of the Yanukovich 
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government [20,26]. Donbas has been one of the more 
economically troubled regions in Ukraine – although the 
steel industry fared well, the coal-mining industry that 
powered the region for nearly a century has been in de-
cline for years [26]. In early April protesters in Donetsk 
and Luhansk stormed government buildings and raised 
Russian flags [27]. On April 7 protesters in Donetsk an-
nounced the creation of the Donetsk People’s Republic 
(DPR). The Luhansk People’s Republic (LPR) was pro-
claimed on April 27 [7,27]. Both DPR and LPR claimed 
the need for secession due to anti-Russian sentiment of 
the EuroMaidan and of the new provisional government.  
These actions quickly escalated into a prolonged armed 
conflict, splitting the country into pro-Ukrainian and pro-
Russian supporters. By May armed paramilitary units had 
taken over most of the region’s urban centers, attacking 
EuroMaidan and interim government supporters [26,27]. 
The Ukrainian army was initially too weak, disorganized 
and under-resourced to mount a significant response. This 
prompted many local residents as well as volunteers from 
across Ukraine to self-organize into pro-Ukrainian volun-
teer paramilitary units to engage the pro-Russian fighters 
in violent clashes. When the Ukrainian army finally en-
tered into the conflict they began to push the pro-Russian 
paramilitary groups back but both sides sustained heavy 
losses. Although Russia officially denied any direct in-
volvement in the conflict [51], evidence of Russian artil-
lery installations, regular army and special forces 
participation has been documented [3,48,49]. 
In September 2014 the Ukrainian government and the 
pro-Russian fighters signed a cease-fire deal in Minsk. 
The agreement was frequently violated and completely 
collapsed in January 2015. A new cease-fire, Minsk II, 
was signed in February 2015. Since then more than a 
dozen cease-fires have been signed with the latest starting 
on December 22, 2017 [52]. The cease-fires have led to 
what some call the “frozen conflict” [9] although dozens 
of soldiers and civilians are killed every month. The mili-
tary response on both sides has formalized and expanded, 
with better-equipped and organized soldiers. On the 
Ukrainian side, most of the self-organized volunteer bat-
talions have now been incorporated into the Ukrainian 
National Guard. The LPR and DPR have also consolidat-
ed and centralized their military operations. The war has 
had staggering human costs. According to the official 
statistics, since April 2014 the fighting cost over 10,000 
lives, with over 2,000 of them civilians, and over 23,000 
wounded [53]. Over 2.5 million have left their homes in 
the Donbas region, fleeing mostly to Russia or to non-
effected parts of Ukraine [50]. 
Despite the fall of the Soviet Union ties between the cen-
tral and eastern parts of Ukraine and Russia remained 
strong due to cultural similarity acquired over centuries of 
joint political rule and myriad familial connections. The 
armed conflict in Eastern Ukraine has split friends and 
families along lines of allegiance and along the borders 
that had suddenly become far less porous. In Russia the 
conflict is almost exclusively discussed as one rooted in 
ethnic differences, while in Ukraine it is seen as rooted in 
differences in political orientation and as an attack on the 
independence and sovereignty of a newly created state. 
Yet to many on both sides of the conflict the war seems 
senseless and incomprehensible. 
Ukrainian EuroMaidan captured the attention of Western 
media and scholars, generating a significant amount of 
scholarship and discussion. Research has highlighted the 
importance of mobile technologies and social media or-
ganizing during the protests [5,22,30]. Self-organization 
and decentralization, enabled by mobile technologies and 
social media, facilitated cooperation and successful re-
sistance despite government attempts to violently disperse 
the protesters [14]. Much of the civic organizing relied on 
neighborhood initiatives as well as on Internet-based 
news and social media [21,22]. Little research, however, 
has continued to study the resulting armed conflict in the 
Donbas region. In the following, we investigate mobile 
technology use and management by soldiers and civilians 
involved in the conflict or affected by it.  
RESEARCH METHODS 
Our method relies on an explorative analysis of narrative 
interviews and observational data. Narrative interviews 
are intended to elicit detailed ‘stories’ and are best under-
stood as reflexive productions by interviewers and inter-
viewees together. They tend not to take the question/ 
answer form associated with traditional social science 
(see e.g. [6,8]). Our approach to data collection is based 
on traveling to the conflict zones or as close as security 
considerations permit. Once in place, we spend time at 
potentially interesting locations, such as the Maidan 
square in Kiev, talk to people that we often meet acci-
dentally, and recruit interviewees (see [29, 43]). In the 
two main field sides, we also drew on initial contacts 
gained through the authors’ networks of acquaintances.  
The data collection took place in Russia and in Ukraine in 
towns bordering the active conflict zones. In November of 
2015 we visited Russia for a week, taking an overnight 
train from Moscow to the city of Belgorod. The Belgorod 
oblast is situated just across the border from the Ukrainian 
city of Khrakhiv and northwest of the LPR. This region 
hosts many Eastern Ukrainian refugees given its proximi-
ty to the border. We spent five days in the region, con-
ducting observations, informal conversations and 12 
interviews. Interviewees included local volunteers, local 
residents with family in Eastern Ukraine, refugees from 
Eastern Ukraine, people directly involved in military 
action in the region (both volunteers and professionals) 
and representatives of volunteer organizations organizing 
unofficial deliveries of humanitarian aid to the LPR. In 
total we interviewed 19 people in individual and group 
situations and informally met more. The second author 
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 extended the trip to visit the Crimea peninsula.1 He flew 
from Moscow to Simferopol, visiting Sevastopol and 
Yalta and conducted observations, informal interactions 
and three interviews with local residents and recent arri-
vals from Russia and Eastern Ukraine.  
In the spring of 2017 we spent a week in Ukraine, visiting 
the cities of Kiev and Mariupol. After spending 2 days in 
Kiev we took an overnight train to Mariupol. Mariupol is 
approximately 20 km from the frontline and 100 km from 
the city of Donetsk – the main city of the DPR. The DPR 
and LPR together constitute the Non-Government Con-
trolled Territories (NGCT), in Ukrainian terms. The city 
of Mariupol saw active military conflict in the spring and 
summer of 2014, but has remained under Ukrainian con-
trol since. We conducted four individual and group inter-
views in Kiev and 15 in and around Mariupol. In total we 
obtained extensive interview data from 22 individuals and 
spent time informally with more. Given the dangerous 
conditions, we did not enter the NGCT.  
In Kiev we interviewed people who have close ties or 
relatives in Eastern Ukraine, volunteers in the Kiev civil 
defense, refugees from Eastern Ukraine and military per-
sonnel on leave from active duty in the Ukrainian army 
and the National Guard. In Mariupol we interviewed 
residents who lived in the city during the military conflict 
in 2014, volunteers helping the Ukrainian army, current 
and former members of volunteer battalions and of the 
Ukrainian National Guard, current and former military 
personnel in the Ukrainian army, refugees from Crimea 
and Eastern Ukraine and individuals who lived in the 
NGCT but worked in Mariupol.  
Our results are based on empirical data collected from 
observations, informal conversations and interviews with 
actors participating in the conflict or living in or near the 
conflict zones. The interviews lasted between 30 minutes 
and 2.5 hours. In total, in Belgorod and in Ukraine three 
interviews were conducted in English with the rest con-
ducted in Russian. The first author synchronously trans-
lated all interviews conducted in Russian. On the Crimea 
peninsula all interviews were conducted in English. Given 
the sensitive nature of the content of the discussions, none 
of the interviews were audio recorded but the authors took 
extensive notes during and after each interview. We do 
not mention names to maintain confidentiality.  
Both authors conducted open and thematic coding on field 
notes and interview notes throughout the visits and after. 
We discussed our coding decisions and identified themes. 
                                                            
1 In March of 2014 the Republic of Crimea signed a Treaty of 
Accession for immediate admission as part of the Russian Fed-
eration after holding a referendum that the international commu-
nity did not recognize. 
Following the fieldwork, we remained in email and social 
media contact with some of our informants on both sides. 
Such contact enabled us to ask for clarifications and fur-
ther explanations throughout the coding and analytical 
process. We continue to monitor news media as well as 
blogs, twitter and social network postings of the individu-
als we encountered and those whose work and online 
activity emerged as prominent in our fieldwork. 
EMPIRICAL FINDINGS 
“It’s a strange kind of war,” a volunteer soldier tells us in 
a café in Belgorod. He explains that he has recently re-
turned from “helping to keep the fascists at bay” in the 
Luhansk region now that the fighting is settling into 
something more organized and the new people’s republics 
– LPR and DPR are formalizing their military units. The 
war is “strange” he said because while the two sides are 
trying to kill each other, mobile phone reception is doing 
just fine and there is electricity and water available in 
those structures that are not too damaged. Mobile tech-
nology, as it turns out, has become key to both sides of 
the conflict for coordinating their lives at war as well as 
for identifying and targeting concentrations of enemy 
fighters. Throughout our fieldwork themes of the capabili-
ties of mobile phones, their function as a life-line in crisis 
and as a way to work around brittle official structures, 
their ability to document the goings on, their lack of dura-
bility in extreme conditions of a military conflict, and 
their government and military surveillance potential con-
sistently came up regardless of which side we spoke to.  
In what follows we discuss the themes that emerged 
across conversations and battle lines. We begin by con-
sidering the military significance of the visibility of mo-
bile phone signals in the field conditions of a military 
conflict. We then describe how the use of mobile phones 
supported keeping in touch with family and friends away 
from the front lines, enabled connections and informal 
support between the soldiers and the civilian residents in 
or near the areas of fighting, and offered ways for soldiers 
to cope with the rigors and boredom of military service. 
Finally, we discuss how expectations of state surveillance 
seemed to shape the use of mobile technologies among 
the refugees, their relatives and the soldiers themselves. 
Telecom infrastructures as military assets 
The capability to geo-locate private mobile phones be-
came an important element of military systems in the 
Donbas conflict. During our fieldwork in Russia in 2015, 
civilians and paramilitary volunteers told us how they 
avoided using their mobile phones too often in conflict 
zones. One of the professional soldiers we interviewed 
explained the reason: “When you hear a drone, you have 
about five seconds to leave your position and run. The 
rocket will fly in that fast.” He noted that drones were 
easier to recognize at night because of their in-flight navi-
gation lights. Locating them in daylight is more difficult, 
especially when they fly very high. Soldiers on the Rus-
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sian side told us that the Ukrainian army was using 
“American drones” to search for active mobile phone 
signals to assist targeting2. 
When we interviewed military personnel and volunteers 
in Ukraine in 2017, the use of mobile phones signals as 
targeting beacons for enemy fire was a constant theme. 
Ukrainian military personnel freely admitted that location 
triangulation is used for targeting by both sides. This is 
not to say that military coordination and action relies on 
mobile phones exclusively. Ukrainian military field de-
ployments also use secure radio communications and 
wired communication field equipment, acknowledging 
that a mobile signal is easy to intercept. 
It is technically possible to locate active devices that are 
exchanging data with the cell tower infrastructure of a 
mobile network. However, even smartphones that are 
switched off can potentially be tracked, depending on 
software and model. Only when the battery is removed is 
there a guarantee that the phone is truly off. Our data 
suggest that the information gained from geo-locating 
mobile phone signals could be used as rocket and artillery 
targeting information. Prior work has reported that satel-
lite phones can be easily geo-located when in use, noting 
that such knowledge was often acquired by civilians and 
activists through potentially life-threatening experience in 
conflict zones [25,29]. Regular mobile phone communica-
tions are similarly vulnerable especially with the coopera-
tion of the telecom operators. At the start of the war many 
soldiers on both sides did not realize this capability was 
present, but quickly learned from personal experience and 
the mistakes of others. Here the type of device plays a 
curious role. Smartphones and tablets turn out to be terri-
ble wartime devices for two reasons. First these devices 
are relatively fragile given the field conditions of trench-
es. As the mother of a young solder in the Ukrainian Na-
tional Guard tells us – “he used to have an iPhone but the 
screen got busted by a blast wave the first time his posi-
tion got shelled.” Second, the fact that the battery in many 
flagship devices cannot be removed means that turning 
them off does not necessarily guarantee safety.   
The problem of visibility to the enemy through mobile 
digital activity is acute and omnipresent. We were told 
that some military positions deploy “glushilki” - devices 
that block phone signal – but these are ineffective because 
they cover a small radius and the batteries run out quickly 
so the military errs on the side of less connectivity as part 
of soldier responsibility. Despite the problems, the mili-
tary recognizes the value of mobile phones, issuing sim-
ple non-feature mobile phone devices to all personnel to 
                                                            
2 In 2017 OECD announced termination of their drone monitor-
ing program to observe cease fire violations because the expen-
sive machines were shot down by both sides too frequently [16].  
be carried turned off and with battery taken out until nec-
essary and in case of emergency. 
Soldier, if you want to survive: 
1. Leave your own SIM card at home. 
2. The best place to get a SIM card is in the zone of conflict 
itself. 
3. If you plan to make a phone call, walk at least 400-500 m 
away from squad positions. 
4. Don’t walk away alone, take an armed friend with you to 
cover you. 
5. The best place to make a phone call is in locations with a 
lot of civilians, preferably in recently liberated towns. 
6. Always keep your phone off. Your life depends on it. Grad 
missiles will hit your whole squad. 
7. Do not accept refill codes or cards from the locals. The 
young woman that brought you a refill card from the 
neighboring village may be working for the enemy. Right 
now FSB and SBU have to process enormous amounts of 
data to identify the mobile phones of our own people and of 
the enemy. Do not make their job easier. 
8. Watch over your comrades – a friend calls his girlfriend 
and an hour or so later your position gets shelled or at-
tacked.  
9. Remember, the enemy could be listening to your conversa-
tions regardless of which SIM card or which telecom op-
erator you are using. 
Table 1. Selection of points from an official military order  
to Ukrainian soldiers. 
To help soldiers cope with realities of active deployment 
the Ukrainian military issues formal military orders for 
limiting technology use (see excerpt in Table 1). Ac-
knowledging that there is little chance new soldiers will 
leave their personal mobile phones at home, the main 
suggestion is to bring non-feature phones that allow only 
calling and texting and that have a long battery life (there 
are few power sources in the trenches). Mobile phone use 
has become the digital version of carelessly lighting a 
cigarette at night and revealing a position to the enemy in 
a combat zone. Where before soldiers were instructed to 
obscure the visual marker of the cigarette, now they are 
told to walk away from the trenches and take a friend 
along to make a phone call. Mobile phones, however, can 
reveal far more than the glowing ember of a cigarette. The 
military order leaflet not only clearly acknowledges the 
fact of surveillance of all communications by both sides 
of the conflict but also instructs how to obstruct it. 
Social uses of mobile phones in war-time 
Despite the very real risks represented by mobile devices 
and the efforts of the commanding structures to limit their 
use, their proliferation among the regular soldiers was 
expected and acknowledged for a range of reasons, some 
of which are detailed below.  
Mobile phones as life-lines in war 
Mobile devices represented very real risks due to potential 
for enemy surveillance, but they were also necessary for 
soldiers to manage their participation in under-resourced 
military infrastructures. On both sides, the start of the 
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 conflict was rife with disorganization and confusion 
where equipment was hard to come by. Our participants 
told us how many heavily relied on their local networks to 
equip themselves and for support throughout. In Russia a 
volunteer soldier, who had fought on the pro-Russian side 
in LPR in late 2014 and early 2015, explained that he 
always kept his phone with him despite the acknowledged 
risk just in case he needed to call for help. He had been 
injured in action after stepping on a mine and ended up in 
a hospital in Luhansk. The wound was too difficult to 
treat at that hospital so he phoned his contacts in Belgorod 
who managed to organize an ambulance for a transfer 
across the border to a hospital in Belgorod.  
In Ukraine mobile phones also offered a way to leverage 
local networks in shoring up the brittle and uncertain 
formal infrastructures. Consider the following example: 
We met K and M, local Mariupol volunteers who organ-
ize support for the army and paramilitary units in the 
vicinity. One afternoon they took us along when a soldier 
had gotten in touch after his detachment was shelled by 
the enemy the previous day. He had ended up in a military 
hospital with a concussion and was asking for some legal 
advice as well as support. K and M first went to the gro-
cery store and then headed to a used goods store to get a 
pair of pants and a t-shirt – the soldier would need clean 
clothes that the hospital was unlikely to provide. We 
drove for some time on bumpy roads through check-
points, eventually arriving in a small village where a 
building has been converted into a field hospital. The 
soldier walked out to the gates to speak to us and to re-
ceive the care-package. He explained his situation – his 
concussion was quite bad and he had lost hearing in his 
left ear entirely, but he still had a year of his draft left to 
serve. His commander initially did not believe he was hurt 
badly enough to warrant a hospital, but when the medics 
diagnosed a severe concussion, he pragmatically called to 
ask where to ship the belongings. The soldier was worried 
about retaining access to military resources given the 
extent of the injury. M, who has a legal background, gave 
extensive advice on the best course of action.  
On the way back K and M explained that although the 
Ukrainian army is much better organized and equipped 
now, the equipment is still low quality and insufficient. K 
told us that the previous winter had been very cold, so 
they used social network sites to organize people in Mari-
upol to knit sweaters for the soldiers. The names of these 
volunteers are known and their phone numbers get passed 
along to soldiers in military detachments stationed in the 
vicinity. Soldiers call to ask for help and advice as the 
volunteers leverage their contacts through Facebook and 
phone calls to respond. Partly this happens because the 
Ukrainian army is under-resourced, partly because of the 
lack of trust in the government that is considered to be 
corrupt and has been repeatedly accused of attempting to 
limit paying out benefits. Mobile phones and social media 
help knit an alternative safety net linking soldiers with 
local civilian supporters. 
Keeping in touch with family and friends 
We asked the Ukrainian soldiers whether they used their 
mobile phones given the dangers and everyone replied 
that of course they kept in touch. After all, mothers, part-
ners, relatives and friends worry for good reasons and 
want regular contact. A young soldier in the National 
Guard tells us that he calls his mom every day either in 
the morning or in the evening. Others call to chat with 
girlfriends or friends (but not too long). At the beginning 
of each interview in Ukraine, we are dutifully told that 
soldiers only use the basic military-issued phones, but as 
the conversation progresses we often learn that they also 
have tablets and smartphones. They tell us then that in-
deed they also use social network sites to talk to friends 
(because otherwise it is possible to go mad). 
This ability to stay in touch allows soldiers to keep in 
contact with what life looks like away from the conflict 
zone. Yet remaining connected with friends, family and 
local civilian volunteers can also occasionally lead to 
terrible outcomes, as soldiers must deal with both military 
realities and civilian concerns. In Ukraine, we heard a 
story about a soldier whose friend told him via messenger 
that the soldier’s girlfriend has decided to dump him. The 
soldier had served two of his three years and was by all 
accounts a reasonable man, but in this case he got sad. His 
commander took away the gun, but the bottle of vodka 
was there and grenades tend to be strewn around the com-
pounds. So he drank the vodka and then pulled the pin out 
of a grenade as his friends slept nearby.  
This story suggests that perhaps soldiers, while facing 
harsh military realities, remain too reachable for civilian 
life. Their everyday experiences in the conflict zone are 
so different from that of their friends that they are likely 
to be incomprehensible. Yet their updates appear in the 
feed just like everyone else’s. This can potentially nor-
malize both the soldier’s digital presence and their availa-
bility to friends and family connected to them. The impact 
of such communication can inadvertently have powerful 
effects. The use of private mobiles, however, has become 
an essential part of the life at war. As one soldier com-
mented: “If they [military command] tried to take away 
mobile phones, there would probably be a riot.” 
Pragmatic negotiations across battle lines 
The ability to connect across distance and borders also 
spawned creation of stories about the possibilities mobile 
technologies and social media might offer. In a war being 
able to negotiate with the enemy soldier to soldier, outside 
the official command structures, can be helpful. One 
commander told us a curious story of a village store locat-
ed in the middle between the positions of the two armies 
where the soldiers negotiated the days on which they can 
go to the store and buy vodka lest they get shot at from 
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the other side. He explained that of course they didn’t call 
each other - such phone calls would be easily visible to 
the security forces and would count as treason. There are 
other ways to connect, for example using the social net-
work platform VKontakte or finding people in common 
through people they know who have moved around and 
have civilian contacts in the vicinity. There are, after all, 
many whose friends and families that have been physical-
ly separated by the battle lines but still maintain contact. 
Somehow they negotiated this very specific non-
aggression agreement, he told us, because vodka was 
purchased and nobody got shot. Mobile technologies, 
social media and personal connections allowed such sto-
ries where the absurdities of war are made banal as people 
work around expectations of surveillance and violence.  
The basic reality of war is boredom 
The cease-fire agreements mean that the Donbas conflict 
is essentially a positioning war – where frontlines rarely 
move and focus is on managing existing positions. This 
also means that much of the time soldiers deployed on the 
front lines are spending time monitoring each other rather 
than in active engagements. Mostly, the soldiers tell us 
that being on the front line is a lot of waiting occasionally 
punctuated by moments of terror. Waiting is boring.  
In nearly all of our interviews and conversations in 
Ukraine the first response we received about social media 
and mobile phone use by soldiers was in line with the 
official policy. The military has taken steps to limit in-
formation leakage through social media. Our informants 
told us that the Ukrainian military requires all military 
personnel to sign a document that commits them to disa-
bling their social media accounts for the duration of active 
deployment. According to recent media reports Russia is 
considering a similar move [35]. 
Despite the fact that soldiers are officially forbidden from 
using private mobile devices on the front lines, most of 
them still do. As one Ukrainian army soldier told us: 
“you’ve got to understand, sitting out there in the dug-
outs, trenches and bunkers for days and even weeks with 
nothing to do, people start going out of their heads. You 
need something to take your mind off of things.” Here 
social media offer a welcome distraction, the threat of 
being located by the enemy becoming less an acute con-
cern despite its very real potential.  
Boredom can lead even the most cautious to do things 
they say they will never do. A military investigator told 
us: “Sometimes everyone in the dug-out is using their 
devices - if a mine or an artillery shell hits and some of 
them live, they abstain for only so long.” Story after story 
we heard that many spend considerable amount of time on 
social media, eventually admitting that many post about 
where they are and what they do as the genre of social 
media demands. As a military incident investigator con-
firmed: “the commanders know, everyone knows but what 
are you going to do?” Social media is excellent at reliev-
ing boredom, downgrading the very real risks of becom-
ing visible to enemy surveillance.  
Keeping up to date with news and information 
We found that Ukrainian civilians and soldiers widely 
shared the opinion that Russian and Ukrainian mass me-
dia are biased and unreliable in the information they pro-
vide. Instead, our interviewees tended to rely on social 
media to better understand the political context and events 
in the war. Civilians pointed to particular journalists and 
media figures they followed on Facebook or smaller-scale 
online media projects. A member of the National Guard 
explained that he gets the best of his information from 
VKontakte groups and other sites where volunteer sol-
diers are active: “People at the front line know what is 
going on.” Groups on social network sites were common 
sources of information. As many interviewees explained: 
“There are people in these groups whom you trust.” 
Social media made possible a broader implementation of 
a kind of “samizdat” – an old tradition of creating alterna-
tives to state news in the Soviet times. For example, when 
speaking about ongoing railway blockades by Ukrainian 
veterans an interviewee stated that he preferred to find 
information via the internet about the new law which 
rendered the blockade legal [13,54]. He claimed that the 
official information was biased and only online was it 
possible to find a more balanced view. Two of our inter-
viewees, having previously served in private and locally 
organized battalions, took part in this blockade. They felt 
that the Ukrainian state TV had misrepresented the veter-
ans as violent outlaws. They stated that the media ma-
nipulated the display of violence: “On TV it looked like 
the protesters were attacking the army, in reality the army 
had beaten up the protesters.” They showed us their own 
webpages and Facebook groups that were oriented to-
wards disseminating information that they felt was more 
legitimate.  
On both sides of the divide we encountered explicit dis-
cussions of bias in government-sanctioned media, often 
pointing to the radical difference in interpretation of the 
same events by different news outlets. In many conversa-
tions, people carefully explained the sources of their in-
formation, sometimes listing regular media, social media 
and various news sites and discussing the discrepancies 
between these. Several soldiers noted that being able to 
tell others what was really going on was an important 
reason to use their mobile technologies.  
State surveillance and mobile phone use practices 
Without exception everyone we spoke to expected that 
their phone conversations and internet activities were 
under at least some surveillance by their own state or by 
the enemy. Our participants did not express outrage or 
concern for this state of affairs. They merely noted its 
existence with statements such as: “of course ‘they’ know 
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 who you talk to or what you are posting” and “of course 
‘they’ are watching.” This expectation of surveillance 
shaped their decisions in what types of mobile phones 
they purchased and what channels of communication they 
chose to use for various different purposes. They con-
structed stories of myth and fact to back up their deci-
sions, similar to what Wash termed “folk stories” [43].  
For example, when we asked a local civilian organizer of 
refugee support and humanitarian aid in Belgorod why 
she was using a simple non-feature mobile phone she 
explained this was her way of ensuring that her phone 
does not get tracked. “It does not get tracked because it 
does not have an Internet connection” she said, convinced 
that this was an important aspect of tracking and locating. 
Her reasons for this concern were not directed towards the 
Russian government but towards the Ukrainian security 
services (SBU). She was worried that SBU might find out 
where she has been and how often she has traveled into 
the Luhansk oblast’ and create problems for her relatives 
living in Ukraine. Despite being quite central to the local 
efforts to support refugees and families still living in 
Eastern Ukraine, she never used the Internet for any of 
her organizing activities because she felt that the Internet 
was even easier to monitor for the SBU.  
Nearly everyone we spoke to both in Russia and in 
Ukraine (the aid organizer included) who had relatives 
still living in the Eastern Ukraine conflict zones used 
Skype or Viber to communicate because calling on the 
phone had become both expensive and unreliable. Skype, 
by virtue of being a western-owned resource, was often 
seen as safer from surveillance than mobile phones. An 
artist from Donetsk, now living in Mariupol as a refugee, 
explained that she expected phone lines to be monitored 
for conversations with people in the zone of conflict. She 
used Skype to speak with her mother because “the Inter-
net in Donetsk is much better than even in Mariupol” and, 
she confided, it is “safer.”  
Expectations of state surveillance among the regular pop-
ulation are of no surprise as both governments have been 
clear about their capabilities. For example, in January 
2014 all mobile phone subscribers who were near the 
scene of the Maidan protests in Kiev received a text mes-
sage from the Ukrainian government informing them that 
they had been registered as participants in a “mass riot” 
and suggesting they disperse [12]. The Russian state 
communication oversight agency, RosComNadzor, rou-
tinely issues notices of which websites have been blocked 
as well as who had been observed accessing these [38].  
Those we spoke to on the Russian side were relatively 
sanguine about being monitored by the Russian state. 
Instead, they worried about their Ukrainian friends and 
family being affected if the Ukrainian state was able to 
track their interactions across the border. Those on the 
Ukrainian side were equally concerned about both Rus-
sian and Ukrainian state surveillance especially if they 
had relatives living either in Russia or in the conflict 
zone. The expectation of monitoring extended to social 
media resources as well.  
A former soldier and volunteer in Mariupol working with 
children orphaned by the conflict explained that his life 
was basically about three or four social media networks. 
He used Facebook, VKontakte and Line intensively but in 
different ways. While Facebook was about his daily life 
and for friends and contacts his age, he had a different 
personality and a different network of friends on VKon-
takte: “I have a different life there, basically speaking 
about ideas”. On VKontakte, he explained, there are more 
young people he can mentor. Using Line, he discussed 
political strategies with his network, laughing he joked 
“how to take over the Rada [Ukrainian Parliament], that 
sort of thing.” Then there are people he talks to on Tele-
gram but those are not frequent conversations. Telegram 
is the only app in his list that offers encryption but he 
ignored our mentioning of this as if he didn’t quite under-
stand what we were talking about.  
When asked why this proliferation of methods of commu-
nication, he notes that different people are on different 
resources and then mentions that Facebook is harder for 
“them” to track because it is American. VKontakte on the 
other hand is a Russian social network site and was ex-
tremely popular among Russian-speaking youth since its 
inception.3 Despite the public take over of the company 
by owners loyal to the Russian government [38], most 
users remained on the social network. VKontakte users 
were responsible for posting content that inadvertently 
confirmed Russian military involvement early on in the 
conflict in Eastern Ukraine and postings on the network 
on this topic have been routinely publicized and then 
swiftly removed [38,42]. The young Russian-speaking 
soldiers and civilians on both sides of the conflict contin-
ue to actively use it. When asked why VKontakte, he says 
“of course the Russian government knows everything that 
happens on VKontakte but that’s where all the young ones 
are who are on both sides of this conflict, that’s where 
they were when it all started!” 
Studies in Post-Soviet states show that there is often an 
expectation of internet blocking and surveillance among 
the population [36]. At the same time, there is also acqui-
escence to the actions of the state complete with post-hoc 
explanations and justifications of its actions [24]. To most 
our participants state surveillance is a logical move on the 
part of the state and they used their communication tech-
nologies with this in mind.   
                                                            
3 The Ukrainian government banned the use of Russian SNS 
VKontakte in the armed forces in May 2017. We report on data 
collected prior to the ban: https://tinyurl.com/l8rk9qg 
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DISCUSSION 
In this paper we offer an account of the role mobile tech-
nologies play for soldiers and civilians involved in or 
affected by an armed conflict. Such an in situ investiga-
tion carried out on both sides of the frontline helps us 
understand the mundane social practices at war and how 
they are shaped by technological devices and infrastruc-
tures, civilian as well as military ones. Though the con-
flict has changed, becoming more organized and 
formalized over time, the soldiers continued to rely on 
local volunteers for sweaters in winter and legal advice 
when in trouble. From the beginning, private mobile 
phones were a key infrastructure in this war. Existing in 
parallel with the army communication infrastructure, 
private mobiles allowed soldiers to link with different 
actors in civil society. As the war unfolded soldiers pre-
dictably used mobile media in creative ways for infor-
mation gathering and even local enemy negotiations but 
they also relied on these devices to relieve the boredom of 
active duty. This continued despite the fact that these 
devices critically endangered them when in use.  
The war in Eastern Ukraine engulfs population centers 
where civilians continue to live between the frontlines. 
There is then motivation to maintain infrastructures re-
gardless of military goals although infrastructure integrity 
is quite uneven. For example, there is considerable con-
cern that water infrastructures are nearing collapse in 
some of the populated areas [32]. Yet people in Mariupol 
frequently commented that Internet connectivity was so 
much better in Donetsk (DPR) than in Mariupol. Infra-
structures function differently in every military conflict. 
In the Donbas conflict, mobile infrastructures were im-
portant enough that we heard unbidden third-hand reports 
of military orders to avoid damaging the cell towers in 
combat. In contrast, in the Syrian civil war, in rebel-
controlled areas the network infrastructure was immedi-
ately switched off by the Syrian government [29]. 
Our narrative demonstrates how the rise of new forms of 
military surveillance technology capitalizes on pre-
existing communication infrastructures and on the prolif-
eration of civilian communication devices that are part of 
the fabric of daily life. The stories we heard suggest that 
there are military technologies, which can use mobile 
phone connections with cell towers for location triangula-
tion rapidly providing targeting coordinates for artillery 
and rocket installations. While there is considerable data 
on how this can be done with satellite phones, we have 
been unable to find solid technical information on how 
regular telecommunications have been integrated into 
such systems. Given our data, we can speculate that this 
technology is able to differentiate local and non-local 
callers (soldiers typically bring their private SIM card 
from places where they have been before). This situation 
is fundamentally different from conditions of natural 
disasters where mobile infrastructures and localization 
technologies can be of help to first responders and to 
those affected. Surveillance technologies under the condi-
tions of war have particular implications for the design of 
always-on always-connected devices.  
The problem of ‘always-on always-connected’ devices  
Given the dangers of the geolocalization of private devic-
es and the surveillance of content generated on social 
media platforms all soldiers of the Ukrainian army had to 
sign an agreement to delete or deactivate their social 
media accounts when deployed to the frontline. Predicta-
bly, we found that the soldiers did not follow this order. 
Officers, we talked to, either did not want to comment on 
this fact or acknowledged that they could not stop the 
soldiers’ use of private mobile devices. HCI research on 
civilian work in office settings has demonstrated that 
formal rules are often bypassed in practice (e.g. [17,44]). 
Clearly, the local reinterpretation of rules happens in 
command line organizations under life-threatening condi-
tions as well. Though the risks are high and rarely fully 
understood, the breach of commands and orders is tolerat-
ed by the military hierarchy for the sake of local needs 
and habits.  
For good reasons soldiers remain connected to civilian 
life through their smartphones and tablets even as they 
engage the enemy in combat. Such connectivity can at 
times lead to normalization of combat experience as it 
gets slotted in between cat videos and vacation pictures in 
the news feed. Connection to normal experience is a draw 
for the soldiers and yet social media use can also mean 
detection by the enemy with tragic consequences. Con-
temporary devices increasingly do not give users the 
ability to really turn them off. Perhaps hardware produc-
ers of mobile devices should be required to implement an 
‘OFF’ button, which effectively switches off technical 
opportunities to locate the device. Such a design would 
considerably increase the security and self-determination 
of their consumers – not only in situations of an armed 
high-tech conflict.  
Social media platforms and their responsibilities  
Social media platforms connect us inexorably with our 
social ties and create expectations of reachability and 
connectivity, generating significant stores of personal 
information. These data stores represent important assets 
from a strategic military point of view. Surveillance is a 
common expectation of war. Soldiers know they are being 
tracked and watched, by both sides and by security ser-
vices. They realize the dangers and yet we are told that 
while talking on the phone is definitely tracked, Skype 
and Viber may be better despite the fact that neither are 
more secure in reality. What are the obligations and re-
sponsibilities of platforms such as Facebook, Microsoft 
(Skype) or VKontakte to their users who are involved in 
or merely end up in the midst of military combat opera-
tions and to their governments, embroiled as they are in 
geopolitical conflicts? 
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 Social practices on social media platforms are great at 
alleviating boredom but these rely on infrastructures of 
surveillance that are pervasive and easily used. The data 
stores these platforms amass are a basis for extensive 
advertising services, but such infrastructures also offer 
convenient ways of identifying and targeting individuals 
of interest by governments and secret services too 
[29,45,46].  
Most of the people we spoke to used social media for 
personal connections and relief from boredom, fear and 
pressure of being part of an active military conflict. For 
those that were of a more activist orientation, social media 
provided a way to keep track of sentiment, to engage 
those who might listen, to lead by example and to push 
their ideas forward. They carefully selected channels of 
communication for the kinds of messages they dissemi-
nated, considering the problems of surveillance and visi-
bility these channels represented. Yet we observed that 
the actual social media use that could be construed as 
radical or even political was relatively infrequent. Our 
study suggests that use of social media channels is a com-
plex intertwining of the practical and the political and 
these need to be considered together to be understood. 
While large-scale analyses of social media activity can 
identify networks and influences, more in-depth studies 
are desperately needed to really delve into the role these 
media have in how people live their lives, accomplish 
their goals and, occasionally, engage in politics within 
environments where state surveillance and real threats to 
personal safety are constantly present [36].  
Such questions cannot be considered without addressing 
the role of the platforms themselves. Platform providers 
have a responsibility to be open about the way they amass 
and collect personal data, with whom they share these 
data, and what access is allowed by government agencies. 
Ideally, platforms need decentralized architectures, dis-
tributed data storage and better security mechanisms. 
People will use social media regardless of surveillance 
and social media platforms will continue to capitalize on 
the personal data they collect. Clarifying the responsibil-
ity for communicating how personal data may be used is 
crucial for users in all contexts to be able to better balance 
the risks. Designing services that make such communica-
tion with end-users possible is crucial. 
Mobile and social media surveillance 
The practices of our informants seemed to rely on a curi-
ous mix of myth and technical understanding combined 
with expectations based on where the servers are and who 
might have access to data. For the most part, the people 
we spoke to did not have significant technical training but 
all seemed to be much more aware of the dangers of per-
sonal data leakage enabled by mobile technologies than 
the average western consumer [37]. Our participants wor-
ried about their own exposure through state surveillance 
(on both sides) for very real reasons and were extremely 
motivated to engage in what some Western privacy activ-
ists have termed “digital self defense” [28]. Their 
knowledge and understanding of data flows and expecta-
tions of whether and how the media companies whose 
services they used might behave were logical, despite 
being potentially wrong. The concept of self-defense, 
whether physical or digital, is about survival and people 
develop folk wisdom and “folk models” [43] for acting 
with technologies to manage personal visibility and risk, 
to survive and to accomplish their goals. 
It is perhaps tempting to think of such unstable conditions 
as a unique environment for the use of social media where 
restrictions, risks and benefits become ambiguous. We 
argue, however, that extreme situations, such as war, 
make the problems of surveillance and exposure of social 
media and mobile technologies unignorable. This demon-
strates the need for better information sources to enable 
actors to better judge the inherent dangers. However, our 
data also point to limitations of efforts to educate users 
about protecting their data. After all, if the clear threats of 
open state surveillance and death do not limit disclosure 
of sensitive information on Facebook, what hope is there 
for mere nudges? 
CONCLUSION 
Our study demonstrates that in considerations of mobile 
technologies two points are important from the point of 
view of HCI research and design. First, any mobile tech-
nology-based solution relies on availability of infrastruc-
tures supporting telephony, and must consider who owns 
and controls these. Second, data sent across mobile infra-
structures is always vulnerable and makes visible its pro-
ducers and consumers. Such visibility can have significant 
and even life-threatening consequences, calling for a 
rethinking of design objectives for consumer communica-
tion devices. Given the rapid development of military 
surveillance technologies in an increasingly unstable 
world, what does it mean to be digitally visible? We argue 
that users of social media and communication technolo-
gies have a right to an understanding of surveillance prac-
tices by the state, the platforms and the military industrial 
complex. It is crucial to ask: How might HCI help make 
surveillance detection a mundane, everyday practice? 
How might we enable people to respond in ways that can 
protect and support them? 
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